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Time has done much to assuage the passions aroused by the con-
troversy over slavery in the United States. Patient investigation North
and South is taking the place of heated denunciation and defence;
many misapprehensions have been cleared away; yet some unfortunate
errors persist even in the writings of candid historians. Of the
measures passed by Congress in the heat of the controversy, none has
been so persistently misrepresented as the Fugitive Slave Act of 185o.
By common consent historians north of Mason and Dixon's line have
taken over the contemporary opinion of men and women who held with
Charles Sumner that the act was "most cruel, unchristian, devilish,
setting at naught the best principles of the Constitution and the very
laws of God."' James Schouler pronounces the act "inhuman and
scarcely within the full shelter of the Federal constitution." 2 The
usually fair-minded Rhodes declares it "one of the most assailable laws
ever passed by the Congress of the United States," the mere statement
of its provisions condemning it as a reproach to Christian America. 3
Yet the mere statement which Mr. Rhodes gives of its provisions
proves quites clearly that he understands neither the Act of IS5o nor
the earlier measure to which it was supplementary. It is the purpose of
this paper to set the Act of 185o against its appropriate historical back-
ground and to test its constitutionality, without reference to the wis-
dom or expediency of its enactment.
The paragraph in the second section of the fourth article of the Con-
stitution relating to the rendition of fugitives from service or labor
was adopted unanimously, and apparently without discussion, by the
Federal Convention.4 In its final form it read:
"No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall
be delivered up on Claim of' the Party to whom such Service or Labour
may be due."
Of this paragraph Judge Story remarked in his opinion in the Prigg
case: "it cannot be doubted that it constituted a fundamental article,
'2 Sumner, Orations and Speeches (185o) 400.
25 Schouler, History of the United States of America (1891) 205-206.
31 Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise of 185o (1893)
185-186.
42 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention (1911) 446.
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without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed."5
This was a favorite thesis with the judiciary of his day, but it is not
supported by any positive historical evidence. Addressing the ratifying
convention in Virginia, June 17, 1788, Madison discussed the paragraph
briefly but attributed to it no particular sanctity above other parts of the
Constitution. He contented himself with pointing out that it offered
a better security to slave-owners than they enjoyed under the Articles ot
Confederation, for "at present," said he, "if any slave elopes to any of
those states where slaves are free, he becomes emancipated by their
laws." "This clause," Madison added, "was expressly inserted to
enable owners of slaves to reclaim them."6  Nor is there anything in
the proceedings of other ratifying conventions which supports Judge
Story's contention.
One possible inference may be drawn from Madison's brief comment.
He at least seemed to believe that the constitutional provision for the
delivery of fugitive slaves would, be adequate to its purpose. At all
events, he does not intimate that more than the constitutional obligation
would be needed to produce faithful observance. Nothing in the
history of the Confederation justified this expectation of state comity, it
is true, and no one knew better than Madison that the states had not
outgrown their old habits. If such was Madison's expectation, it was
soon disappointed, for the provisions of the Constitution proved neither
self-executory nor adequate.'
In June, 1791, Governor Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania made
demand upon Governoi Randolph of Virginia for the surrender of
three men who were charged with having forcibly seized a negro in
Washington, Pennsylvania, and taken hir into Virginia with the inten-
tion of selling him as a slave. This act of violence was declared by
Governor Mifflin to be "contrary to the Act of the General Assembly."
Governor Randolph declined to comply on three general grounds: first,
because the alleged offence did not seem to fall within the category of
crimes mentioned in article IV, section 2, of the Constitutions ; secondly,
because in any case the offence was not of such character as to give
Pennsylvania exclusive jurisdiction; thirdly, because the Constitution
'Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842, U. S.) 16 Pet. 539, 611. Justice Tilghman
said in Wright v. Deacon" (1819, ]?a.) 5 Serg. & P, 62, 63: "It is well known
that our southern brethren would not have consented to become parties to a
constitution . . . ., unless their property in slaves had been secured." Judge
McLean said in Giltner v. Gorham (1848, C. C. D. Ill.) 4 McLean, 402, 425:
"The clause was deemed so important, that, as a matter of history, we know the
Constitution could not have been adopted without it."
"3 Farrand, op. cit., 325.
It may be argued, of course, that here, as elsewhere, the framers of the
Constitution may have preferred to leave Congress to supply the machinery of
administration rather than overload the document with details.
"Treason, felony, or other crime" is the statement of the second paragraph.
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was silent as to the mode in which fugitives are to be apprehended and
removed, leaving to the state authorities only the use of force, which
was contrary to the State Constitution and laws.
Governor Mifflin referred the case to President Washington, who in
turn sought the opinion of the Attorney-General, Edmund Randolph,
and finally laid the correspondence before Congress in a special
message. The Attorney-General sided with the executive of his native
state to this extent, that he was fully justified in refusing delivery of
the fugitives until the Governor of Pennsylvania had furnished satis-
factory evidence that the alleged offenders had fled out of Pennsylvania
and had been found in Virginia. It would have been "more precise,"
too, for the Governor of Pennsylvania to have transmitted an authen-
ticated copy of the law declaring the offence. On the other hand, the
Attorney-General was of the opinion-the Governor of Virginia to
the contrary, notwithstanding-that exclusive jurisdiction of the offence
did belong to Pennsylvania, and that the surrender of the fugitives
(once satisfactory evidence was supplied) was a federal duty and
implied the "right of using all incidental means in order to discharge it."
"I will not inquire here," continued the Attorney General, "how far
these incidental means, if opposed to the constitution and laws of Vir-
ginia, ought, notwithstanding, to be exercised; because ... [the
offenders] may be surrendered without calling upon any public officer
of that State. Private persons may be employed, and clothed with a
special authority. The Attorney-General agrees that a law of the
United States might so ordain; and wherein does a genuine distinction
consist between a power deducible from the constitution, as incidental to
a duty imposed by that constitution, and a power given by Congress as
auxiliary to the execution of such a duty ?"'
It was probably the considerations suggested by this controversy
which moved Congress to enact the law of 1793. No controversy over
the delivery of fugitives from labor seems to have been brought to the
attention of Congress before this date; yet both objects were brought
within the purview of this Act.10 Congress anticipated, it would seem,
the same difficulties in the way of the delivery of fugitive slaves as of
fugitives from justice. But was the owner of a slave placed in a similar
predicament in securing the delivery of his property? Could he not
seize his property wherever found under authority of the Constitution,
and without the aid of either federal or state officials. No less an
authority than Joseph Story held that "under and in virtue of the
Constitution, the owner of a slave is clothed with entire authority, in
every State in the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, wherever
he can do it without any breach of the peace, or any illegal violence."'
9 20 AMER. STATE PAPERS, MISC. I, 42.
1An Act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the
service of their masters. February 12, 1793 (1 Stat. at L. 302).1Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842, U. S.) 16 Pet. 539, 613.
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But it was precisely the possibility of breach of the peace and illegal
violence which made legislation by Congress seemn desirable, if not
imperative. As counsel in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, fifty
years later, remarked, 12 free negroes might have been kidnapped at will,
and rival claimants to the same fugitive would have had to settle their
claims by force, had Congress not prescribed a procedure in the
delivery of fugitives from service.
The Act passed by Congress in 1793, then, had a two-fold purpose:
first, to facilitate the extradition of fugitives from justice; and
secondly, to assist the owners of slaves to recover their property
without recourse to violence, and without breach of the peace. The
first sections, accordingly, provide that upon demand of the State or
Territory from which an alleged criminal has fled, the executive of a
* State or Territory to which the fugitive has escaped shall cause his
arrest; and shall deliver him to the agent appointed to receive him.
With the demand shall be presented a copy of an indictment found
against the fugitive from justice or an affidavit charging that he has
committed treason, felony, or other crime, duly certified by the
Governor of the State or Territory from which he has fled. The agent
receiving the fugitive shall then be empowered to transport the fugi-
tive to the State or Territory from which he has fled and any attempt at
molestation is made punishable by fine and imprisonment. The third
and fourth sections authorize a person to whom service or labor is due,
or his agent, to seize the fugitive in any State or Territory to which he
may have fled; to take him before any federal judge in such State or
Territory, or "before any magistrate of a county, city, or town cor-
porate;" and to offer proof by oral testimony or by affidavit certified
by a magistrate of the State or Territory from which he has come, that
the fugitive owes service or labor to the claimant. If satisfied by the
proof the judge or magistrate shall issue a certificate of the facts which
shall be sufficient warrant for removing the fugitive to the State or
Territory from which he has fled. Any attempt to obstruct the
claimant in seizing his property or to rescue the fugitive or to conceal
him, is made punishable by fine.
The coupling of these two objects in the same act would seem to
indicate that the framers conceived of the rendition of both kinds of
fugitives as a process of extradition. In the first instance, the extra-
ditional process is carried out by state agents; in the second, by the
claimant, with the aid of federal or local officers. The attitude of mind
of those who legislated in 1793 was largely determined by the habits
formed under the Confederation. A more perfect union had been
formed, it is true, but it was still a union of states with large residuary
powers and it was a union inter pares. There is abundant evidence
"Ibid. 577.
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that the members of the Senate long continued to think of themselves
as plenipotentiaries from quasi-independent states. Between these self-
governing republics many of the forms and much of the spirit of
international intercourse still obtained. The provisions of the Con-
stitution for the extradition of fugitives from justice and labor and
the act of 1793 simply gave a definite- expression to what had hitherto
been a sort of international comity. Nothing was further from the
thoughts of Congress than to create a national police charged under a
federal statute with the duty of apprehending fugitives from justice
and labor. So far as possible existing state agencies were to be
employed in the process of extradition.
In actual operation the latter sections of the Act of 1793 were found
to contain ambiguities and to encounter practical difficulties. Had
Congress authority to employ state and local officers for extraditional
purposes under article IV, section 2, of the Constitution? Had
Congress authority to legislate at all in the premises? Such authority
is nowhere expressly conferred in the Constitution; and if conferred
at all, it must be by implication. From what substantive grant of
power, then? Other embarrassing questions of competence arose.
Could a state, in the exercise of its police power for the protection of
the public, in effect, throw obstacles in the way of the apprehension of
fugitives from service and labor? Could a state forbid its magistrates
to perform the federal services imposed by the act? Could a state
magistrate, in default of state law, of his own volition refuse to per-
form obligations laid upon him by the Act of 1793 ?
The first part of the Act of 1793, affecting the extradition of
fugitives from justice, contained no such ambiguities and gave occasion
for few difficulties in practical operation. " It still stands as part of the
law of the land. No one questions its constitutionality either on the
ground that it leaves the fugitive from justice without the right to trial
in the state to which he has fled, 13 or on the ground that he is denied the
""The person demanded has no constitutional right to be heard before the
Governor." See Roberts v. Reilly (1885) 116 U. S. 8o, 6 Sup. Ct 291. But it
is generally agreed that the Governor may inquire into the sufficiency of the affi-
davit or indictment, to ascertain whether it charges the alleged fugitive from
justice with a crime according to the laws of the State demanding his extradition.
The Governor may also take steps to assure himself of the identity of the person
apprehended with the person demanded as a fugitive from justice. The first of
these inquiries is a question of law and judicial in its nature: it may be instituted
by an application for a discharge upon a writ of habeas corpus. How far the
second matter-the identity of the prisoner-may be reviewed judicially is still a
moot point. See i Bailey, Jurisdiction (1899) sec. 388. In any case, the question
of guilt or innocence is not a proper subject of inquiry, in the State where the fugi-
tive is apprehended, but must be determined by the tribunals of the State where
the crime is alleged to have been committed. Ibid. 399. See also People v. Brady
(1874) 56 N. Y. 182; People v. Donohue (188) 84 N. Y. 438; Kingsbury's
Case (187o) io6 Mass. 223.
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writ of habeas corpus.1 4 Keen dissatisfaction with the Statute so far as
fugitive slaves were concerned was soon voiced by those States which
lay on the confines of free soil. Losses of slaves were sufficiently
numerous to move Maryland to appeal to Congress in 1817 for a new
law. The burden of complaint was that Pennsylvania had enacted
laws against kidnapping which operated so as to prevent the seizure
and recovery of fugitive slaves. A critical moment arrived in the
history of the Act of 1793, when, in 1842, the constitutionality of one
of these state acts was called in question in the Supreme Court of the
United States.
The essential facts in the famous case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania'5
may be stated very briefly. Prigg was the agent of Margaret
Ashmore, a citizen of Maryland, who claimed the services of a negro
woman who had escaped into Pennsylvania. He had entered the State,
had caused the negro woman to be apprehended by a state constable
acting under warrant of a magistrate of Pennsylvania, and had then
presented the fugitive before the magistrate for a certificate author-
izing him to remove her to Maryland. Upon the refusal of the
magistrate to take further cognizance of the case, Prigg then carried
the negro woman and her children across the State line and delivered
them into the custody of Margaret Ashmore. For this action he was
indicted and convicted of felony under a Pennsylvania statute of 1826.
By agreement between Maryland-which State had undertaken the
defence for Prigg-and Pennsylvania, the case was then carried on writ
of error from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The judgment of the Supreme Court, delivered by Mr. Justice Story
and sustained by all the seven justices present, declared the Act of
Pennsylvania unconstitutional and void and reversed the judgment of
the court of Pennsylvania. Five of the seven justices affirmed the
power of Congress to legislate in the premise; one denied the
power; and one declined to consider the question. Not all of the five,
again, seem to have agreed with the reasoning by which Mr. Justice
Story defended the power of Congress; and many differed sharply
from his interpretation of the obligations of state officials.
Addressing himself first to the question of the competence of Con-
gress to legislate on the subject, Justice Story took the position that
the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution constituted
"a fundamental article without the adoption of which the Union could
not have been formed." Had the Constitution not contained this
article, every non-slave-holding State would have been at liberty to
declare all runaway slaves free within its limits. But with this
provision, the Constitution contains "a positive unqualified right on
United States v. Booth (858, -U. S.) 21 How. 506; It re Tarble (1871,
U. S.) 13 Wall. 397.
'* (1842, U. S.) 16 Pet. 539.
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the part of the owner of the slave, which no State law or regulation can
in any way qualify, regulate, control, or restrain." The owner's right
to his property continues-in the State to which the slave has fled, and
he is therefore clothed with entire authority to seize and capture his
slave "wherever he can do it without any breach of the peace, or any
illegal violence." "In this sense, and to this extent this clause of the
Constitution may properly be said to execute itself." But the Con-
stitution does not stop with the mere recognition of a right, which
circumstances may render void, but contains a clause, which implies
at once a guaranty and a duty: "But he shall be delivered up on claim
of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." "Now a
claim," said Story, "is a demand of some matter as a right made by one
person upon another, to do or to forbear to do some act or thing as a
matter of duty." To present the claim and to secure the delivery, some
legislation is necessary. If then the Constitution guarantees the right
and requires the delivery of a slave on claim of the owner, clearly "the
national government is clothed with the appropriate authority and func-
tions to enforce it."' 6  Not content with this deduction of general
authority, Story points out further that a claim to property must be
made against some other person and thus implies a controversy between
parties-one of those cases, in short, which may arise under the Con-
stitution and to which the judicial power extends.17  Congress may,
therefore, without question, prescribe the mode in which the judicial
power shall function.
Justice Wayne, however, who in general supports Story, declared
flatly' s :
"The case of a fugitive slave is not like that of a contest for other
property, to be determined between two claimants by the remedy given
by the tribunals of the state where the property may be. It is not a
controversy between two persons claiming the right to a thing, but the
assertion by one person of a right of property in another, to be deter-
mined.upon principles peculiar to such relation."
"Story added further: ".... the national government, in the absence of all
positive provisions to the contrary, is bound, through its own proper departments,
legislative, judicial, or executive, as the case may require, to carry into effect all
the rights and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution." (i6 Pet. 616.) And
again: "The end being required, it has been deemed a just and necessary implica-
tion, that the means to accomplish it are given also; ... ." (ibid. 61g). By way
of example Story points out that no one has ever questioned the power of
Congress to apportion representation, though the power is nowhere expressly
conferred and is usually derived from the power to provide for an enumeration
of the population. But here, it may be remarked, the general grant is specifically
to Congress. The second section of article IV-if it confers any power at all-
certainly does not designate the department of government which shall exercise it.
" It should be noted in passing that Story did not make clear who the parties
to the controversy were. The claimant might conceivably be one of the two, but
who was the other-the official who was to make the delivery?
"8Prigg v. Pennsylvania, supra, at p. 646.
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And so far as the other justices are concerned, the power of
Congress to legislate was assumed to flow from the implied obligation
of article IV, section 2.
Again, in discussing the question whether the power of legislation on
the matter of fugitive slaves was exclusively in the national government
or concurrent in the states, Story reiterated that the right to retake
fugitive slaves, the duty to deliver them, and the corresponding power
in Congress to use appropriate means to enforce the right and duty
were derived wholly from the Constitution. Before the adoption of the
Constitution the return of the fugitive was a matter of comity between
the states, not a matter of moral or political obligation. The Constitu-
tion created "a new and positive right, independent of comity, confined
to no territorial limits and bounded by no State institutions or policy."
It would be absurd, therefore, to suppose that the Constitution intended
to leave the national government dependent upon the states for the
execution of its obligation. The very nature of the power, indeed, is
such-continued Story-that it must be controlled by one and the
same will, in order that it may operate uniformly.'9
In only one particular did Story express any doubt about the con-
stitutionality of the Act of 1793. He intimated that the part which
conferred authority upon state magistrates was not free from
uncertainty.
"As to the authority so conferred upon state magistrates, while a
difference of opinion has existed, and may exist still on the point, in
different states, whether state magistrates are bound to act under it;
none is entertained by this Court that state magistrates may, if they
choose, exercise that authority, unless prohibited by state legislation.20
Communities in which the current of anti-slavery sentiment ran
strong, promptly availed themselves of this loophole in the Act of 1793.
A crop of so-called Personal Liberty Acts sprang up, of which the
Vermont Act of November I, 1843 is a fair sample.21 It forbade any
' Story quoted with approval the dictum of Marshall in Sturgis v. Crowninshield
(1819, U. S.) 4 Wheat 122, 193; "Whenever the terms in which a power is
granted to Congress, or the nature of the power, require that it should be exercised
exclusively by Congress, the subject is as completely taken from the State Legis-
latures, as if they had been forbidden to act on it." This denial of concurrent
jurisdiction was not supported by the entire bench. Chief Justice Taney, for
example, held that, while no State might pass any law in conflict to that of
Congress, the States still have the right to aid in the enforcement of the constitu-
tional obligation.
'°Prigg v. Pensylvania, supra, at p. 622. Justice McLean, however, did not
share this doubt. He conceived that the Constitution required a positive duty of
the states to surrender fugitive slaves on claim and that Congress might prescribe
in what manner the claim and surrender might be made. ". . . . although, as a
general principle, Congress cannot impose duties on state officers, yet in the cases
of fugitives from labor and justice, they have the power to do so." Ibid. 665.
Vt Pub. Acts, 1843, no. 15.
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state court of record, or judge, or justice of the peace, or any other
state magistrate, to take cognizance of any certificate in any case arising
under the Act of 1793; it forbade any executive officer of court, or any
other officer, or citizen, to seize, arrest, or detain, or to aid in the
seizure, arrest, or detention of any person claimed as a fugitive slave,
and to transport or to aid in the transportation of such person; and it
imposed as penalties a fine of one thousand dollars, or imprisonment
for not more than five years. In such states the slave owner was
helpless unless he was within reach of a judge of one of the federal
courts. The cry went up from the slave-holding States that they were
being deprived of "that solemn constitutional guaranty so sacredly
pledged" at the formation of the Union and that they were now no
better off than they had been under the old Confederation.
"No citizen of the South," complained the legislature of Virginia,
"can pass the frontier of a non-slaveholding state and there exercise his
undoubted constitutional right of seizing his fugitive slave, with a view
to take him before a judicial officer and there prove his right of owner-
ship, without imminent danger of being prosecuted criminally as a
kidnapper, or being sued in a civil action for false imprisonment-
imprisoned himself for want of bail, and subjected in-his defence to an
expense exceeding the whole value of the property claimed, or finally
of being mobbed or being put to death in a street fight by insane
fanatics or brutal ruffians. In short, the condition of things is, that at
this day very few of the owners of fugitive slaves have the hardihood
to pass the frontier of a non-slaveholding state and exercise their
undoubted, adjudicated constitutional right of seizing the fugitive."
22
It was under these provocative circumstances that the bill "to amend
and supplementary to, the Act of 1793" was drafted, introduced into
Congress, and adopted with surprisingly little debate by both Houses.
23
On September i8th, 1850, President Millard Fillmore set his signature
to the Act which, according to Charles Sumner, earned for him
eternal infamy. "Other Presidents may be forgotten; but the name
signed to the Fugitive Slave Bill can never be forgotten. . . . Better
far for him had he never been born; better far for his memory,
and for the good name of his children, had he never been President !"
With somewhat less uncharitable judgment, Mr. Rhodes wrote forty
years later, "This infamous act has blighted the reputation of every-
one who had any connection with it, and he has suffered with the rest."
What were the provisions of this momentous legislation of 1850?
It should be noted at the outset that the Act of 185o does not repeal
the earlier act or any portion of it. The avowed purpose was to render
Va. Pub. Acts, 1849-5o, pp. 240-254, 248, quoted by 6 Ames, State Documents
on Federal Relations (i9o6) 10-12.
An Act to amend atd supplementary to, the Act entitled, "An Act respecting
Fugitives from Justice and Persons escaping from the Service of their Masters."
approved February twelfth, one thousand seven hundred and nitety-three. Sept
18, 185o (9 Stat. at L. 462).
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the Act of 1793 adequate to the constitutional guarantees which had
been given to the owners of escaped slaves. This general purpose was
to be fulfilled; first, by providing effective instrumentalities for the
execution of the Act; and secondly, by freeing these agents from
molestation, either at the hands of private citizens or of local officials
in states where reluctance to return escaped slaves overcame the sense
of public obligation. The first sections of the Act, accordingly, author-
ize and require federal commissioners to exercise concurrent jurisdic-
tion with the judges of the District and Circuit Courts of the United
States, and to grant certificates to claimants, upon satisfactory proof,
with authority to take and remove fugitives from labor to the State or
Territory from which they may have fled. These commissioners are,
or are to be, appointed by the Circuit Courts of the United States.
Such commissioners were already authorized by the Judiciary Act of
1789 to exercise the powers of any justice of the peace or other
magistrate of any state by arresting, imprisoning, or bailing offenders
for any crime or offence against the United States. To these original
powers were now added the powers and duties conferred by the Act
of 185o. To the superior court of each organized territory was
given like power to appoint commissioners for these general and par-
ticular purposes, as need should arise.
The Act furthermore enjoined all marshals and their deputies to
obey and execute all warrants directed to them and made them liable
to a fine of one thousand dollars for refusal to receive or failure dili-
gently to execute a warrant or other process issued under the provisions
of the Act. If a marshal suffered a fugitive once in his custody to
escape, or, if a fugitive escaped without any connivance on the part of
the marshal, that officer was made liable for the full value of the ser-
vice or labor of the fugitive in the State or Territory whence he had
escaped. *The better to execute their duties under the Constitution and
the Act, the commissioners were authorized to appoint suitable persons
to aid in the execution of the warrants and other processes; and they
and their appointees were authorized, furthermore, to summon to their
aid the bystanders or posse comitatus of the country. And all good
citizens were commanded to aid in the prompt and efficient execution of
the law wherever their services should be required.
The owner, or his agent, was authorized by the terms of the act to
pursue and reclaim his fugitive slave either by procuring a warrant
from a federal court or commissioner, or by seizing such fugitive where
he could do so without process. He was then to present such person
before the proper court, judge, or commissioner, whose duty it was to
hear and determine the case of the claimant in a summary manner. To
this court, judge, or commissioner, satisfactory proof was to be pre-
sented by the claimant; first, that he was entitled to the services or
labor of the fugitive whom he sought, and secondly, that the person
arrested was in fact the fugitive to *hose services or labor he was
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entitled. Satisfactory proof was defined in the act as a duly authenti-
cated transcript of the deposition or affidavit made by the claimant
before any court of record in his state or territory, to the effect that
a person owing him service had escaped, accompanied by a general
description of the fugitive. But other and further evidence, either oral
or in writing, might be required if the court, judge, or commissioner
thought necessary; and in default of a transcript of a court record, the
claim might be heard and determined "upon other satisfactory proofs,
competent in law."
Satisfactory proof of identity having been offered, the court, judge,
or commissioner was to grant a certificate setting forth the substantial
facts in the case and authorizing the removal of the fugitive t6 the State
or Territory from which he had fled. This certificate was to be held
conclusive of the right of the claimant to remove his property and was
to exempt him from molestation "by any process issued by any court,
judge, magistrate, or other person whomsoever." Any one obstructing
a claimant in arresting a fugitive or attempting to rescue a fugitive or
endeavoring to conceal a fugitive, so as to prevent his discovery and
arrest, was made liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars and
imprisonment not exceeding six months, and also liable to civil damages
to the party injured by the loss of a slave by such illegal conduct.
The features which made this act so odious to men and women who
abhorred human slavery strike one in the face. It seemed to them
drawn with diabolical ingenuity. It was all too likely to accomplish its
nefarious purpose. It closed the gap left in the Act of 1793 by the
decision of Mr. Justice Story in the'decision of Prigg v. Pens sylvania.
Bitterly they resented those provisions which declared illegal all humane
efforts to shield the unhappy fugitive from his captors and which made
slave-catchers out of bystanders when a miserable slave was attempting
to elude or resist capture. Good citizens were asked to suppress all
natural emotion and human pity while an unhappy fellow-being was
being sent back to bondage. It may well be contended that an act
which outraged the feelings of half the people of the United States was
ill-advised; but the question of expediency is not here under discussion,
-only the more difficult question of constitutionality.
Contetnporary criticism was directed mainly-to three supposedly vul-
nerable points in this Act of 1850: first, at that provision which denied
to a fugitive the right to testify in his own defence; secondly, at that
which provided for a summary procedure before judge or commissioner
without trial by jury; and thirdly, at that provision which seemed to
deny the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In his own vehement
way Sumner summarized the case against the act as follows:
"This is the Fugitive Slave Bill-a bill which despoils the party
claimed as a slave-whether he be in reality a slave or a freeman-of
the sacred right of Trial by jury, and commits the question of Human
Freedom-the highest question known by law-to the unaided judg-
ment of a single magistrate, on ex parte evidence it may be, by
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affidavits, without the sanction of cross-examination. Under this
detestable, heaven-defying bill, not the slave only, but the colored free-
man of the North, may be swept into ruthless captivity. . .. In
denying the Trial by Jury, it is three times unconstitutional; first, as
the Constitution declares, 'The right of the people to be secure in
their persons against unreasonable seizures;' secondly, as it further
declares, that 'No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law;' and, thirdly, because it expressly declares,
that 'In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.'
By this triple cord did the framers of the Constitution secure the Trial
by Jury in every question of Human Freedom.
' 24
To these major articles of indictment Stmner added two others:
"These officers are appointed, not by the President with the advice of
the Senate, but by the Courts of Law; they hold their places, not
during good behavior, but at the will of the Court; and they receive
for their services, not a regular salary, but fees in each individual case.
And yet in these officers,--thus appointed and compensated, and holding
their places by the most uncertain tenure-is vested a portion of that
'judicial power,' which, according to the express words of the Consti-
tution, can be in 'Judges' only, who hold their office 'during good
behavior,' who, 'at stated times, receive for their services a compen-
sation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,'
and, it would seem also, who are appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. And, adding meanness to the violation of
the Constitution, the Commissioner is bribed by a double fee, to pro-
nounce against Freedom. If he dooms a man to slavery, he receives
ten dollars; but if he saves him, his fee is five dollars.
25
These charges, repeated substantially by Mr. Rhodes, 6 though in less
vehement language, may be considered in reverse order. To assume
that the framers of the Act of. 1850 purposed effectively to secure the
rendition of fugitive slaves by a paltry bribe of five dollars convicts
Sumner and his followers of a want of humor. There may be crea-
tures low enough in the human scale to perjure their souls for five
pieces of silver, but the federal judges have not usually been held in
such contempt. The fact that Charles Sumner was at this moment
holding an appointment as commissioner from his friend Judge .Story
should have deterred him from making so grotesque a charge. One
would hesitate to dwell upon the point had it not been pressed with
such insistence. The -most effective retort was made by Senator
Douglas to an excited and hostile audience in Chicago in the autumn
of 1850.
"All court officials who derive their compensation from fees rather
than salaries," said he, "are usually paid for labor performed. There
was surely nothing unreasonable or reprehensible in awarding a fee of
ten dollars to a commissioner who made out a certificate for the return
242 Sumner, Orations and Speeches (1850) 400-401.
" Ibid. 402.
I Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise of x85o (1893)
185-186.
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of an escaped slave and only five dollars when he simply heard the
claimant and decided against him, and was thus spared the additional
labor of preparing a certificate.
'27
The obvious reply to, Sumner's charge that the commissioners were
judicial officers and therefore held their places by an unconstitutional
tenure is, that they were not "judges" within the meaning of the first
section of the third article of the Constitution, but inferior officers
whose appointment Congress may "vest as they think proper . . . in
the Courts of Law." If it be contended, however, that by virtue of the
Act of 185o, commissioners, while not "judges," were clothed neverthe-
less with judicial authority, and, therefore, should hold office by a like
appointment and tenure, it may be replied that many officers have
quasi-judicial duties without holding their offices by judicial tenure,
such as sheriffs, county commissioners, commissioners in insolvency,
and even judges of territorial courts, and in our own time members of
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. Commissioners had been appointed by the Circuit Courts at first to
take bail and affidavits in civil cases. Authority was subsequently given
them to take depositions, and even to arrest and imprison for trial per-
sons charged with offences against the laws of the United States; and
yet though exercising these quasi-judicial duties, or duties ancillary to
court proceedings, it had never been intimated that they should have
been appointed by the President and commissioned during good
behavior.
More serious is the allegation that the Act of I85o denies, by general
implication, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to the fugitive
taken into custody. "The certificates . . . shall be conclusive of. the
right . . . to remove such fugitives . . . and shall prevent all molesta-
tion of such person or persons by any process issued by any court,
judge, magistrate, or other person whomsoever." It was the opinion of
the Attorney-General, John J. Crittenden, however, that this provision
of the Act did not suspend, and was not intended to suspend, the priv-
ilege of the writ, because Congress could not suspend the privilege of
the writ without a violation of the Constitution, 2 and the intent to vio-
late the Constitution ought not to be imputed to them by mere implica-
tion. The Attorney-General found no incompatibility between the Act
and the privilege of the writ. The purpose of the writ is to institute
an inquiry into the causes of commitment or imprisonment and to
deliver the complainant from all manner of illegal confinement. The
fugitive slave in custody, like all other prisoners under the laws of the
"See Allen Johnson, Stephen A. Douglas: a Study in American Politics (i9o8)
I9I-194. In Miller v. McQuerry (1853, C. C. D. Ohio) 5 McLean, 467, 481,
Judge McLean took the same view of this provision of the Act.
""The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it." U. S.
Const. art. I, sec. 9.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
United States, has the privilege of the writ; but whether he shall be
granted the writ must depend upon the judgment of the proper tribunal.
Now by the Act in question, Congress has established a tribunal or
tribunals with exclusive jurisdiction to determine summarily who are
fugitives from labor and to whom such labor is due. The judgment
of every such tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction must be conclusive upon
every other tribunal. Wherever judgment is shown upon application
of the fugitive for a writ, it prevents the issuing of the writ; and if
the writ has been issued, the judgnent of the tribunal discharges the
writ upon its return.
As for the last words of the sixth section of the Act-"and shall pre-
vent all molestation," etc.-the Attorney-General assumed that they
meant no more than what the Act of 1793 meant by declaring that a
certificate "shall be sufficient warrant for removing the said fugitive
from labor."2 9
The constitutionality of the Act of 1850 was most insistently chal-
lenged because of its apparent conflict with the fifth and seventh articles
of amendment. If no person may be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law,"0 and, if in suits at common law, trial
by jury must be preserved, 3' the summary procedure of the commis-
sioners would seem to be in flat contradiction to the constitutional guar-
antee of civil liberty. This was the emphatic opinion of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin in In re Booth.82 According to judge Smith, the
presentation of a claim by the owner of a fugitive slave by legal process
is the commencement of a suit, for according to the dictum of Chief
Justice Marshall, a suit is the "prosecution, or pursuit of some claim,
demand, or request."3 3 "The trial of such a claim is the trial of a suit.
Therefore the trial thereof must not only be had before a judicial
tribunal, but whether proceedings be commenced by the fugitive to
resist the claimant, or by the claimant to enforce, and establish his
claim, it would seem that either party would be entitled to a jury."34
To the argument that proceedings instituted to reclaim and repossess
a fugitive from service did not constitute a "suit at common law" within
the meaning of the Constitution, the Court replied that this question had
already been judicially determined, and quoted with approval Justice
Story's dictum that the seventh amendment was meant "to embrace
The general tenor of the Attorney-General's opinion indicates ihat he held the
action of the commissioner to be judicial and hence not subject to review by issue
of the writ of habeas corpus. It may be inferred, on the other hand, that the
Attorney-General would concede the right of another tribunal to issue the writ
to review the judgment of a commissioner, if such an officer was regarded as
simply a ministerial or administrative agent
"Article V of the amendments to the Constitution.
'Article VII, ibid.
'(1854) 3 Wis. 1, 39.
'Cohents v. Virginia (1821, U. S.) 6 Wheat. 407.
"In re Booth, supra, at pp. 39-40.
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all suits which are not of equity or admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may
be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights."'3 5
Underlying these opinions was the assumption that the proceedings
before the commissioner were not only judicial in character (hence
falling under the positive injunctions of the fifth and seventh amend-
ments) but conclusive. According to Judge Smith, who wrote the
Wisconsin opinion, delivery of the fugitive by the commissioner meant
that he was "reduced, without further process or trial, to absolute
subjection, to be taken whithersoever the claimant may desire." In
this opinion, Judge Whiton concurred:
"We are therefore obliged to conclude that the alleged fugitive from
labor is taken back to the State from which he is said to have escaped,
as a person who has been proved and adjudged to be a slave, and, as we
believe, without due process of law, without having his rights passed
upon and determined by a jury of his peers."38
But it was precisely this underlying assumption which defenders of
the Act of 185o challenged. Were the proceedings before a commis-
sioner judicial arid therefore conclusive? Arguing the famous Robbins
case in the House of Representatives, February 2o, i8oo, John Mar-
shall called attention to the significant fact that the Constitution declares
the judicial power to extend to all cases-not questions-arising under
the Constitution, treaties, and laws.3 7 Had the judicial power been
extended to all questions, the courts might have encroached upon the
functions of the executive. And in connection with claims arising
under the Treaty of 1819 with Spain, Congress had authorized a fed-
eral district judge to adjudge losses and to report his findings to the
Secretary of the Treasury. In the United States v. Ferreira,8 Chief
Justice Taney held that no appeal could be taken from the federal
district judge to the Supreme Court.
"The decision is not the judgment of a court of justice. It is the
award of a commissioner. The Act of 1834 calls it an award. . . The
powers conferred by these acts of Congress, upon the judge as well as
the Secretary, are, it is true, judicial in their nature. For judgment and
discretion must be exercised under both of them. But it is nothing more
than the power ordinarily given by law to a commissioner appointed
to adjust claims to lands or money under a treaty; or special powers"
to inquire into or decide any other particular class of controversies in
which the public or individuals may be concerned. A power of this
description may constitutionally be conferred on a Secretary as well as
on a commissioner. But it is not judicial in either case, in the sense in
which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the courts of the
United States." o
'Parsons v. Bedford (i83o, U. S.) 3 Pet. 433, 447; see also 2 Story, Com-
mentaries on the Constitution (5th ed. i891) 545-554.
"In re Booth, supra, at p. 70.
"5 Wheat Appendix I.
(1851, U. S.) 13 How. 47-48.
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In line with this opinion is the decision of Judge McLean in Ex parte
Robinson.
3 9
"The nature of the duties of the Commissioners under the Act of 1850
is not, in principle, different from those which they previously dis-
charged. . . It must be admitted that this inquiry is somewhat in the
nature of judicial power; biut the same remark applies to all the officers
of the accounting departments of Government. They investigate
claims, and decide on the evidence. The examiners in the Patent Office
determine the merits and novelty of inventions. This becomes a
judicial duty in every suit between conflicting patents. It is imprac-
ticable, in carrying on the machinery of government, to prescribe precise
limits to the exercise of executive and judicial power in deciding upon
claims. The Supreme Court has had the acts of these Commissioners
before it, and has always treated them as having authority under
the law."
Much the same point of view was takei by judge Sprague of the
United States District Court of Massachusetts. A proceeding was not
judicial, he contended, merely because an officer or magistrate must
ascertain facts and law and act thereon in a particular case. The com-
missioner is to grant or withhold a certificate to carry the fugitive from
service or labor from one state to another. The certificate states facts
which the commissioner believes to be established; "but these facts are
not thereby judicially established, but may be controverted in any
future proceedings between the same parties." "What may be legally
done with that person in the State to which he is carried, depends upon
the laws of that State, and not upon anything in the certificate."
40
The suggestion thrown out by Judge Sprague is highly significant
and was given full value in subsequent decisions. In the Burns case,
(1854) Commissioner Loring remarked that the arrest of the fugitive
is a ministerial and not a judicial act, and that the nature of the act was
not altered by the means used. If extradition was the purpose of the
statute and determination of the identity of the fugitive the only pur-
pose of the proceedings under it, trial by jury was not necessary. The
Constitution does not guarantee jury trial for the initial proceedings
in extradition.41 In his dissenting opinion in the Booth case, Judge
Crawford pursued the same fertile thought.
4 2 To his mind there was no
essential difference between the demand for a fugitive from justice and
the claim of a party to whom service or labor is due.
"In either case there is a deprivation of personal liberty without the
intervention of a jury, but it is considered essential to the complete
enforcement and fulfillment of the constitutional compact, that a tem-
porary deprivation should be permitted in the individual case, in order
that the constitutional right may be secured. It is true, that in the case
'9 (1855, C. C. D. Ohio) 6 McLean, 355.
" Quoted in 2 Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage (1858) 695.
417 Monthly Law Report, 2o4, cited in 2 Hurd, op. cit., 677, note.
'ln re Booth (1854) 3 Wis. 1, 83-84.
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of a fugitive from justice, he is given into the custody of the officers
of justice, with the beneficent presumption of the law in favor of his
innocence, until he shall have been duly convicted; while in the case of
the fugitive from labor, he is placed under the control of his claimant, to
be carried back to the State from which he is charged to have fled, with
no presumption in favor of his freedom; but this is, I think, more an
argument against the policy and justice and humanity of the law, than
against its constitutionality. A case might arise where, by false swear-
ing and conspiracy, a freeman, by the machinery of this law, might be
snatched from his liberty and reduced to the condition of slavery, until,
by a suitable proceeding, he asserted and obtained his freedom; but so,
also by similar means, an innocent man may be carried away charged
with crime, and placed under the necessity of vindicating his innocence
in a distant State."
That extradition and not the final settlement of a right was the pur-
pose of the Act of 1793, and of the Act of 185o supplementary to it,
seems hardly to admit of rational doubt. The fact that the Act of
1793 couples the return of the fugitives from service or labor with the
extradition of fugitives from justice certainly points to this conclusion.
The first and second sections are devised to enable the agent appointed
to recover the fugitive from justice "to transport him or her to the
State or Territory from which he or she shall have fled ;" the third and
fourth sections declare that the certificate granted to the claimant of a
fugitive from service or labor "shall be sufficient warrant for removing
the said fugitive from labor to the State or Territory from which he or
she fled." To this purpose the amendatory and supplementary Act of
185o adds nothing. The sixth section declares that the certificate shall
be "conclusive," it is true, but "conclusive of the right to remove such
fugitive": the certificate is conclusive for this purpose alone. There
is nothing in either act to warrant the supposition that summary hear-
ing is for any other purpose than extradition. And if it be said that
there is not in either act any provision for further and conclusive trial
for the determination of the right asserted, it may be replied that the
laws of the United States do not provide for trial of the crime or
offence for which the alleged fugitive from justice is extradited.
4 3
'The parallelism between the action of governors of States in delivering up
fugitives from justice and the action of commissioners in delivering up fugitives
from service or labor was vigorously denied by northern writers like Hurd. (The
Law of Freedom and Bondage.) It was argued that while the powers of the
Commissioners were derived from the United States and could only be regarded as
an extension of the judicial power, the Governors acted by virtue of their powers
as chief executives of their States. Even if the States had not passed acts to
enable the executive to make delivery of fugitives from justice, still the power
would belong to the executive department of the State government. The quasi-
international law of the colonial period is assumed to continue between two states,
which are thus made essentially one jurisdiction, the criminal law of the two being
connected by the national law. (2 Hurd, op. cit., 625.) This quasi-international
status was not conceded in the matter of fugitives from service and labor because
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The denial of trial by jury and of the right to testify in his own behalf
applies to the fugitive from justice as well as to the fugitive from labor,
and injustice may be done to perfectly innocent persons in either case.
This aspect of the matter was admirably stated by Benjamin R. Curtis
in an opinion written for the United States marshal in the Sims case :44
"If it be in the power of Congress to provide for the giving up of
fugitives from justice without a trial by jury, which has been practiced
on by the States for more than half a century, and never doubted, it
seems to me the power is even more free from doubt in the case of a
fugitive from service. Fugitives from justice may be, and often are,
citizens, and under the protection of the Constitution are entitled to
the benefit of its provisions; fugitives from service, when slaves, are
not thus entitled. Fugitives from justice cannot be seized and carried
away without some inquiry and legal process; fugitives from service
may be taken anywhere, by those having a legal claim, and by force of
the legal title carried from the State. If it be said that a person may
be seized, and, after this summary inquiry carried away, who is not
of the difference between state laws relating to freedom and bondage and because
"the delivery of a person accused of crime is a preliminary proceeding in reference
to a prospective exercise of judicial power." This latter reason, it will be observed,
rests upon the assumption which the author is trying to prove and is thus worth-
less. It has yet to be shown that the action of a commissioner was not prospective
to the final determination of facts in the State from which the fugitive had fled.
Another curious argument which Hurd stated with approval rests on no better
foundation. The action of the commissioner is final and the action of the
governor ancillary because by the terms of the Constitution the fugitive from
justice is to be delivered up, "to be removed to the State having jifrisdiction of the
crime" while the Constitution is silent as to the fugitive from service or labor,
simply stating that he "shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such
service or labor may be due." Nothing would therefore prevent the claimant from
removing his alleged slave to another state than that in which he resided or from
simply holding his property in the State where the fugitive had been apprehended,
if that were a slave-holding state. In this case, asks Hurd, triumphantly, what
becomes of the trial of facts? How could the master be forced to return to his
own State for the final ascertainment of his right to the alleged slave? Had
Congress, however, provided for the slave's continuing in national public custody
in transitu until the claim was finally determined, then the chief constitutional
objections to the act would have been removed. (2 Hurd, op. cit., 696.) "Then
there would be a real parallelism between the removal under the Commissioners'
action and an extradition in the case of a fugitive from justice." But it may be
replied that no such assurance is given that a state agent who receives the alleged
criminal will deliver him up for trial. The agent is a state, not a national officer.
Why could he not also elude final trial by leaving the country with his prisoner if
he were bent on kidnapping him for some nefarious purpose? A defect or defects
in the Act of i85o cannot be pleaded as a reason for declaring unconstitutional the
powers actually conferred. Congress might properly be censured for its want of
foresight in providing for all possible contingencies, but the courts would hesitate
on this account to declare void the positive means taken to reach an end sanctioned
by the Constiitution, if they were well within the purview of that document
4' (i85i, Mass.) 7 Cush. 285.
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a fugitive from service, and thus a citizen may be temporarily, and
perhaps finally, deprived of his liberty, because he may not find means
to defend himself where he is carried; it may be said also that a per-
son may be carried away, who is not a fugitive from justice, and may
be unjustly and oppressively dealt with in the place to which he is
transported. The truth is, the Constitution has in view neither of these
cases. It provides great general rules and powers, leaving to legis-
lation to guard and limit the practical application of those powers so
that injustice shall not be done; and if opportunity is given for injus-
tice, it is the fault of the Legislature who have not wisely exercised
their powers, but by no means proves that the action of the Legislature
exceeds its powers."
To Northern men and women living in the heated atmosphere of the
slavery controversy, this way of reasoning seemed inconclusive. They
had full confidence that the fugitive from justice would receive fair trial
in the State from which he had fled; they did not feel the need of
throwing safeguards around the summary process which preceded his
rendition; they acquiesced, therefore, in the unquestioned practice of
half a century. But they regarded the argument of analogy from the
law concerning the rendition of fugitives from justice as altogether
specious. Who really believed that when a master had a negro in his
possession he would present him for trial in the courts of his own
State, or that the officials of these courts would be punctilious in settling
the question of right when a master returned with a negro and the cer-
tificate of a commissioner? The Northern mind clung to the prepos-
session that the negro slave had no chance to win his freedom in courts
which were controlled by the slave-holding class. To this type of mind,
a merely legal argument made slight appeal. Where was the evidence
that the unhappy fugitive slave would receive even the semblance of a
trial when extradited to the State from which he had fled?
While the Fugitive Slave Bill was under discussion in the summer
of 185o, repeated efforts were made in Congress to secure consideration
of amendments which would guarantee a fair trial to the fugitive in
the State by whose laws he was said to be held to service or labor. One
amendment proposed that in case the alleged slave should dispute the
findings of the commissioner or judge and claim his freedom, the owner
should give the commissioner or judge bond that he would take him to
the court of the county in which he resided and there allow a trial of
the facts by jury.45 Another amendment-in effect a substitute for the
original bill-provided for a trial in the State to which the reclaimed
fugitive should be taken, which trial was "to be conformable to the
laws of the State in that behalf.4
(i85o) 22 (part i) Congressional Globe, ist Sess., 31st Cong., App. 571.
"Ibid.
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The first of these amendments was supported by Henry Clay in the
Senate not as a matter of justice to the escaped slave, but as a conces-
sion to Northern sentiment.
"It is granting to the slave," said he, "only the right which he now
indisputably possesses, in all the slave-holding States, of resorting to
their tribunals of justice to establish his claim to freedom if he has one."
Testifying to facts within his own experience, Clay said further:
"I have never known an instance of a failure on the part of a person
thus suing to procure a verdict and judgment in his favor, if there were
even slight grounds in support of his claims.
47
Senator Underwood of Kentucky, who urged the second amend-
ment, endorsed all that his colleague had said.
"In my section of the country and in all the Southern States, if a man
is held in custody as a slave, and can find a lawyer and present anything
like a plausible case for freedom, his situation will at once induce that
lawyer to institute a suit without fee or reward; and in my section of
the country, the laws give a man thus circumstanced an opportunity of
prosecuting his claim in forma pauperis . .. Ii fact, it is a matter of
professional pride that every man shall have his case properly inves-
tigated and fairly adjudicated upon."
48
Senator Underwood agreed with Clay, also, in thinking that an
amendment providing for trial of the facts in the State from which the
fugitive had escaped, however unnecessary from his point of view, was
a wise concession to public feeling in the North. If such a provision
was not made, he feared that the North would insist that inquiry into
the facts and trial should be held in the State where the fugitive should
be apprehended. "Trial abroad," he declared, bluntly, "is ruinous
to us."
But Senator Mason of Virginia, the reputed author of the bill, and
the intransigeant Senators who followed his lead, turned a deaf ear to all
pleas for concession. All amendments were rejected, largely, it would
seem, because the rights of the fugitive were believed to be amply safe-
guarded in the slave-holding States,4 9 and because the slow procedure
necessitated by jury trial was a costly matter to the planter. Address-
ing the Senate on this subject, Jefferson Davis of Mississippi declared
that "the right of jury trial, if there be any question as to the condi-




" "In my own state, and I doubt not in the State of Kentucky, and every other
slave State, they [slaves] are not only entitled to be heard, but the law requires
the master, on a prima facie case being made out, to give a bond and security that
the slave shall not be removed until the case is decided. It allows him to sue
it forma pauperis, without costs, provides for his safety while the suit is pending,
and provides that he shall have full liberty to consult with counsel, summon
witnesses, and prepare for trial." Aug. 22, 1850. (part 2) Ibid. 1611.
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in every slave-holding state.50 Such assurances, coming from South-
ern leaders who were thoroughly distrusted as mere mouth-pieces of
the slave-owning barons, carried no conviction to Northern minds;
and an extended search through local court records has yet to be made
before the3 can be thoroughly substantiated. From a cursory exam-
ination of the session laws of the border slave States, from which most
of the slaves escaped, the writer is persuaded that substantial justice
was on the whole accorded to the negro claiming his freedom.
51 It is
not clear, however, that in suits for freedom, jury trial was either
necessary or usual. 2 The negro suing for his freedom was usually
allowed counsel and could have his master and witnesses subpcenaed.
Further to protect the petitioner, the master might be required to give
bonds to present him at court on the date set for hearing or trial.
It has already been remarked that contemporary criticism of the
Act of 1850 proceeded from the assumption that because the duties of
commissioners were quasi-judicial, the powers conferred by act of
Congress were derived from the third article of the Constitution. In
other words, the Act of 1850 was constitutional only if considered as an
extension of the judicial power of the United States. From this point
of view the powers of the commissioners would be subject to all the
limitations in the Constitution which hedged about the judiciary. As
administrati~re agents for purposes of extradition, on the other hand,
the commissioners would exercise wide powers affecting liberty and
property without being circumscribed by the restrictions imposed by the
Constitution upon the judiciary. The rapid development of adminis-
trative boards and agents in the last half century throws a new light on
the determinations left to the commissioners by the Act of 1850. Such
boards and officers frequently exercise powers which are judicial in
their nature and reach conclusions which affect property rights; yet
these determinations are now held to constitute "due process of law" and
are conclusive. The Supreme Court has said in unmistakable lan-
guage53 that "there are matters, involving public rights, which may be
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which
Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of
the United States, as it may deem proper." "It is true, also, that even
in a suit between private persons to try a question of private rights, the
50 Ibid. I588.
See, for example, the Act of Missouri "to enable persons held in slavery to
sue for their freedom." Rev. Sts. i856, ch.. 69.
"A Delaware law of 1852 provided that "the court shall hear proofs in a
summary way and upon satisfactory evidence that the petitioner is entitled to his
freedom, shall adjudge and decree accordingly, and shall discharge him from his
master's custody." Rev. Sts. 1852, ch. 8o. A thorough-going investigation of the
laws and court procedure relating to slaves is greatly needed.
'Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken, etc. Co. (1855, U. S.) i8 How. 272-284.
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action of the executive power, upon a matter committed to its deter-
mination by the constitution and laws, is conclusive." The authority
conferred upon the Postmaster-General to exclude from the mails
matter tending to encourage crime and immorality or fraudulent matter,
is a power which may vitally affect private business. It is judicial in
character, for determinations are reached after inquiry and hearings.
The essence of a judicial inquiry, Mr. Justice Holmes has said, is that
it "investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on
present and past facts and under laws supposed already to exist."
5 4
The powers conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission fur-
nish another instance of judicial powers conferred upon an administra-
tive board. Yet the determinations of the Commission reached without
jury trial and affecting vast property interests are held to conform to
due process of law. Even more striking and pertinent to the subject
of this paper is the authority conferred by the federal laws regulating
immigration upon the Department of Labor. To boards of immigrant
inspectors, subject to appeal to the Secretary of Labor, belongs the
decision of cases involving no less a matter than American citizenship.
Chinese, born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, are citi-
zens by the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet should such a
citizen have the temerity to leave the country and then seek re-entrance,
'his constitutional rights would be determined by the immigration board
without trial by jury. He becomes subject to the exclusive provisions
of our immigration laws, according to the ruling of the Supreme
Court.55
The people of the United States have travelled far on the road to
government by administrative commissions since the middle of the last
century. So long as they acquiesce in the extraordinary determinations
reached by administrative boards regarding rights of citizenship, they
are likely to look with less and less passion upon the controversy which
culminated in the assault upon the constitutionality of the Fugitive
Slave Acts. Measured by the developments of a half-century and
interpreted in the light of reason, these acts must be declared con-
stitutional in every particular.
" Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line (198o) 211 U S. 210, 226, 29 Sup. Ct 67, 69.
Cited by Charles W. Needham, Judicial Determinations by Administrative Com-
missions (1916) io AmER. Po1. Sci. REv. 235, 236.
'Lewis v. Frick (1914) 233 U. S. 291, 34 Sup. Ct. 488; Ueberall v. Williams
(1911, S. D. N. Y.) 187 Fed. 47o. Cited by Louis F. Post, Administrative Deci-
sions in Connection with Immigration (1916) IO AmER. POL. Sci. REv. 251, 254.
